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Abstract 
This paper aims at measuring the individual and national 
welfare losses due to non-participation in employment. The 
calculations are made front a micro-economie point of view 
and based on assumptions of the human capital theory. We 
measure welfare losses as the hypothetical loss of produc-
tion resulting from one additional year of intermption or 
postponement of the worMng career. Depreciation of human 
capital due to non-use in the intermption period and fore-
gone experience are taken into account. 
We estimate the welfare losses for individual cases with 
specific charactensücs with respect to age, educaüonal level 
and length of intermption spell and use multiplication 
factors to calculate the national welfare losses. 
WELFARE LOSSES OF NON-PARTICIPATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
by R.D. Bastianen, FA.G. den Butter and J.C. van Ours . 
1. The problem 
The employment participation rate, i.e. the ratio of the number of persons with a 
'J paid job in the Netherlands and the total population between the age of 15-65, is 
low in comparison to other industrialized countries. The three main elements of 
this low participation rate are the high number of unemployed persons, the huge 
number of recipients of public disablement benefits and the low number of women 
participating in employment. 
In the Netherlands in 1987, 36.7% of the total female population aged between 15 
and 65 years had a paid job. This is low when compared with the 47.2% participa-
tion rate in Germany and very low compared with the 71.0% participation rate in 
Denmark. In the same year employment participation rate of men in the Nether-
lands amounted to 68.8% which is again below Germany with 73.9% and far below 
Denmark with 83.0 %. 
Chart 1 shows the development in unemployment and disablement. Unemployment 
has fallen since 1984, whereas disablement has been increasing over the reference 
period. Since 1986 the number of recipients of public disablement benefits is higher 
than the number of unemployed persons1. 
Obviously, this low employment participation incurs costs both for the individual 
non-participant and for the society as a whole. These costs are associated with 
income transfers from participants to non-participants, loss of production and 
depreciation of human capital. With respect to unemployment, Feldstein (1978) and 
Okun (1981) provide a classification of the various costs, whilst Junankar (1989), 
the European Trade Union Institute (1984) and Mittelstadt and Roberti (1984) give 
estimates of total costs of unemployment under alternative assumptions. 
Junankar presents a low and a high costs scenario for several European countries 
using estimates based on Okun's law. The results show that in 1983 the costs of 
unemployment vary from 13 to 21 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Using a different calculation method, the European Trade Union Institute esti-
mates the potential production from Gross National Product and unemployment. 
The results of 1982 vary from 9.4 to 25 percent of the GNP in the Netherlands, 
depending on whether or not an Okun factor is used. In the lower benchmark 
estimate of Mittelstadt and Roberti, the total loss of production due to unemploy-
ment in the OECD-area amounts to about 6 percent of OECD output. 
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 According to recent estimates, registration problems result in actual unem-
ployment being some 40 per cent lower than the level of unemployed persons 
registered at the public employment offices. The main problem is that the public 
employment offices are not notified in time that unemployed workers have found 
jobs. 
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Chart 1. Development of unemployment and disablement in the Netherlands, in 
persons  
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This paper presents calculations of welfare losses due to non-participation in 
employment both on the individual and on the national level. We base these 
calculations on assumptions derived from the human capital theory. The human 
capital theory has been applied in calculating the value of household production by 
calculating opportunity costs. We basically use the same principles, but the new 
elements in our analysis of estimating the welfare losses of non-participation in 
employment are that we account for depreciation of human capital and foregone 
workexperience. Although our calculations refer to the Netherlands and are inspired 
by the low employment participation rate, the methodology is generally applicable. 
In section 2 we defme our concept of individual welfare losses and specify the as-
sumptions underlying our calculations. Section 3 explains the method by which we 
calculate welfare losses of non-participation. In section 4 we illustrate this method 
by calculating the welfare losses for some specific cases. In section 5 the national 
welfare losses of a low employment participation rate are calculated. In section 6 
we investigate the sensitivity of our calculation method. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Definitions 
We define welfare losses of non-employment participation as the economie costs for 
the society as a whole 2 and identify the welfare losses as the hypothetical loss of 
production due to non-participation. 
However, as a basis for actual calculations of welfare losses the above intuitive 
notion of this concept is much to vague. Therefore, this section provides an 
operational definition and lists a number of assumptions underlying the calculations. 
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 We are not concerned with possible social or political costs. Social costs 
may occur because of a possible relation between non-participation and criminal 
behaviour. Political costs may occur because of civil disobedience and a low tax 
moral due to the large transfer payments from workers to non-participants. More-
over growing racism and political extremism may lead to political costs. 
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Moreover, welfare losses should be clearly distinguished from collective costs. The 
latter are, for a large part, actual costs, which incur directly from low employment 
participation. Social security transfers to non-participants are an easily quantifiable 
part of these collective costs. Some collective costs are hypothetical as well, such as 
tax payments and social security contributions which cannot be collected because of 
the low level of income and expenditure as a result of the low employment 
participation. 
The literature considers welfare losses as potential losses of both present and future 
production. This study defines the welfare loss at the individual level as the costs 
incurred by that individual from one extra year of non-participation. We therefore 
calculate the size of the loss of production when individual non-participant enters 
employment at year t+1 instead of year t. In the calculations of the potential 
production we account for the depreaation of human capital and forgone work 
experience incurred during this extra year of non-participation. 
We distinguish between primarv and secondary welfare losses. Primary welfare 
losses are potential production losses of non-participants in year t, including their 
actual depreaation of human capital in that year. Secondary welfare losses occur 
because of future losses of production. These costs relate to the depreciation of 
human capital itself, as a consequence of being out of employment for one 
additional year. We define these costs in year t as the difference between potential 
production of that person over the remaining part of his working life when re-
entry to employment occurs in year t, and the potential production with re-entry in 
year t + 1. This loss of human capital is not only determined by the difference in 
number of years which remain for production, but also by the depreciation of 
human capital during the extra year of non-participation. 
Primary welfare losses are flow figures and are expressed in guilders a year. 
Secondary welfare losses are stock figures, expressed in guilders over the remaining 
working life. However, if we define the secondary welfare losses as the difference 
between the human capital of an individual measured at two moments in time, 
secondary welfare losses are flow figures as well and can be added consistently to 
the primary welfare losses in order to obtain total welfare losses. 
Clearly collective costs and welfare losses are not completely independent. Not only 
will non-participants pay less taxes during their spell of non-participation but also 
afterwards, since they will eam less after their re-entrance to employment than 
persons with the same characteristics who have remained in employment. Chart 2 
ülustrates the main relationships between welfare losses, collective costs and their 
component parts defined in this section. 
This study calculates individual welfare losses as potential production losses that 
depend on the individual's characteristics with respect to education, work experi-
ence, age and the duration of non-participation. Therefore, each case considered 
relates to a group of people who are homogeneous with respect to the above 
characteristics. The yardstick for the calculation of potential production is a person 
with the same characteristics with full working hours who has never left employ-
ment. 
3 
Chart 2. Relation between collectlve costs and welfare losses of non-participation. 
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The calculation of welfare losses of non-participation obviously requires a number 
of firm, or even heroic, assumptions conceming potential production and the 
depreciation of human capital of the non-participant. 
Firstly, we assume that wage costs fully and correctly reflect labour productivity, as 
implied by the neo-classical theory in the case of perfect competition. 
Secondly, we take the actual wage costs as a basis for our calculation. Hence we 
assume that a mass entrance of non-participants to employment will not lead to a 
general fall of labour productivity. Moreover we assume that there is no selecüvity 
bias and hence that the least productive will not be the first to loose their job and 
become non-participants. 
Thirdly, we assume that there will be no demand constraints (and hence no sur-
pluses of supply) when all non-participants, up to some normative level of participa-
tion, become productive. Hence we do not consider the costs involved in creating 
jobs for the non-participants. We are obliged to make this assumption because we 
look at individual welfare losses, and do not compute feedback effects on a macro 
level by, for instance, using a macroeconomic model. Therefore, our calculation of 
the individual welfare losses can, when aggregated over all relevant non-participants, 
be regarded as gross welfare losses. They may constitute an upper limit for the 
macroeconomic costs of non-participation. 
Our fourth assumption is that all non-participants up to a specific level would 
accept an offered job. This assumption especially relates to the female non-
participants, and becomes relevant when aggregating individual welfare losses. Yet, 
this assumption is implicit when calculating individual welfare losses. 
The same holds for the fifth (and related) assumption: work within the home and 
voluntary work are considered to be non-productive. 
The sixth and last assumption relates to the fact that we use estimates of age-wage 
costs profiles from available earnings data. When using these data with respect to 
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different levels of education, we implicitly assume that all participants are employed 
exactly in accordance to their speofic level of education and capabilities, and that 
nobody has a job which requires a higher education or has a job which could be 
held by somebody with less capabilities. 
3. Welfare losses and depr^atinn nf human capital. 
Age-income profiies can be specified in several functional fonns. Among the variety 
of variables postulated to explain eamings during the life cycle, years of education 
and work experience, or age are the variables which are neariy ahvays used. In 
most of the empirical studies the natura! logarithm of eamings is specified as the 
dependent variable. For the independent variables the literature distinguishes two 
functional fonns: a natura! logarithmic experience term and a combination of a 
linear and a quadratic work experience term. In a comparative study Heekman and 
Polachek (1974) conclude that there is ambiguity across data sets in preferring one 
or the other specification. The number of years of schooling is mostly specified as a 
level. In our calculations the natura! logarithm of work experience is used: 
(1) In yT = (a + b ln(x+c)) 
where yT 
x 
income at age T 
work experience 
Note that if this person enters his first job, bis work experience is equal to zero 
and his income wil! be exp(a + b ln(c)). Coëfficiënt c may be interpreted as 
'pseudo' work experience which is acquired during the educational career. Chart 3 
summarizes the main theoretical arguments with respect to the disruption of a 
working career using age-income profiies. (See e.g. Groot, Schippers and Siegers, 
1988; Mineer and Ofek, 1982). For the sake of simplicity, income is drawn as a 
linear function of age; however actual age-income profiies usually show diminishing 
increases of income with age. 
Chart 3. Linear age-income profile for a conünuous and an intemipted woridng 
career. 
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Line ABL of chart 3 represente the profile of a worker who has a payed job from 
leaving school until retirement. The profile ABCDEFG mirrors the income of an 
individual person who disrupts his working career at age V. In this disrupted 
working career case we may distinguish four stages: the period before interniption 
(AB), the interniption jjeriod (CD), the restoration period (EF) and the post-
restoration period (FG) . The presence of these theoretical stages has been tested 
in several empirical studies, the results of which wül be summarized below. 
Assumptions are then made concerning these different stages, on the basis of these 
results. 
When the non-participant returns to employment his wage will be lower than when 
he left employment, due to the depreaation of the stock of his human capital. The 
theory of human capital provides a number of arguments for this depreaation, 
some of which are summarized under the heading atrophia (see Groot es., 1988, 
p.220). There are several empirical studies on the yearly depreaation rate during 
the interniption period and there appears to be much divergence between the 
results. They vary between zero percent (Corcoran, 1979) and 9 percent per year 
(Mineer and Ofek, 1982). We will assume that human capital depreciates during the 
period of non-participation by five percent per year. 
In the period immediately following re-entry, human capital will be restored rapidly 
because of the new work experience. In this restoration period wages rise quickly. 
Mineer and Ofek (1982) pay specific attention to this so called rebound effect and 
estimate it to be 5.8 to 6.4 percent in the first year after re-entry. In our study we 
will abstract from a rapid recuperation. 
In the post-restoration period we assume that the growth rates of income of the 
two types of workers are equal. Both persons spend part of their time investing in 
human capital so that their investment ratio (the ratio of investment expenditures to 
gross income) will be equal, which is in line with various empirical studies (Mineer 
and Polachek, 1974; Mineer and Ofek, 1982; Corcoran, 1979). 
Additionally we assume that the actual depreaation of human capital does not 
continue indefinitely: There is a minimum level of human capital. We assume that 
actual depreaation onry lasts for two years. After two years the eaming capacity of 
the non-participant remains constant (Möller, 1990). 
Our calculation method for individual welfare losses of non-participation is based 
on assumptions derived from human capital theory. The income and depreaation 
proGles for a (non-)participant are depicted in chart 4. The chart graphically 
illustrates our calculation method. In the case of a continuous working career the 
worker of chart 4 has a lifetime income equal to the area ABCD. We assume that 
he enters employment at age F and retires at age Z. 
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 The broken line ABCDEFG (chart 3) is the profile of an involuntary 
interrupted working career. In the literature (Mineer and Polachek, 1974; Mineer 
and Ofek, 1982; Cox, 1984) is often mentioned that an individual who anticipates an 
interniption of his career accumulate less human capital in the period before 
interniption (AB) than a worker who expects a continuous career of payed work. 
The slópe of the line AB will be kss steeper in de case of an expected interniption 
than in the case no interniption is expected. 
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Chart 4. Primary, secondary and total welfare losses of non-participation accord-
ing to the age-income profile 
Now suppose that this person interrupts his working career at age T-h. Hereafter 
investment in human capital stops and instead depreciation takes place. If this 
person never finds a job his earning capacity is indicated in chart 4 by the broken 
Ene MNO. The horizontal part of this broken line is a result of the assumption 
that depreciation is bounded by some minimum level.4 This assumption can be 
formalized for the depreciation factor p as follows: 
(2) />=l-h£, 
and 
P=P*, 
where 
for (1-hfi) > p* (line MN) 
for (1-hS) < p* (line NO) 
p = total depreciation ratio of human capital 
= 1-hfi 
p* = maximum depreciation ratio 
h = length of interruption period in years 
8 = annual depreciation rate of the stock of 
human capital 
If this person finds a job his lifetime eamings over the post-interruption period will 
be equal to area EGHD. If this worker postpones his re-entry for a further year, 
commencing work at time T+l rather than T, his lifetime income over the post-
interruption period will be the area JKLD. 
We calculate the individual welfare losses as losses resulting from the delay of one 
year in re-entering employment. These losses are equal to the difference of the 
area EGHD and the area JKLD. This is the shaded area in chart 4. 
The calculation method can be formalized as follows. When no interruption takes 
place the eamings of a representative worker at age T, are equal to 
4
 This minimum level and hence the period during which actual depreciation 
takes place, may differ according to the educational level of the representative 
worker. 
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(3) yT = exp (a + b ln(x+c)) 
where yT = income at age T 
x = work experience 
The above formulation of the income profile implies a decreasing investment ratio 
of human capital with growing age. Next we calculate the potential wage at age T 
of the person who has left employment at age T-h as 
(4) yf.h = exp (a - ln^ + b ln(x+c)) 
where yfh = potential income at age T with length of the 
interruption period h 
4> = yT / (y-r-t. * P) 
yT.h = income at moment of interruption 
The ratio <j> in this equation represents both the lack of work experience (yT/yT.J 
during the period of interruption and the depreciation of human capital (yT.h * py. 
It calculates the income difference between a worker with a continious and an 
interrupted carreer at the moment of re-entry in employment. 
When this representative non-participant does not enter employment again at 
moment T but at moment T+l, his potential income will be 
(5) y?+i,h+i = exP (a - l«w» + b ln(x+c)) 
where T} = yT+1 / (yT+1.h * P) 
Note that not only income at moment T or at moment T+l is relevant for 
calculating the individual welfare losses, but also the income earned over the rest of 
the working life. In order to calculate this remaining lifetime income (indicated by 
the areas EGHD or JKLD in chart 4), we calculate the discounted value of these 
future earnings at period T. (With T the base year for our calculation of the 
welfare losses of one additional year of non-participation). The discounted value of 
the remaining lifetime income in the case of re-entry at moment T is equal to 
(6) *Tlh = X y V ^ - * * 
T 
where ?rTh = discounted value at T of potential remaining 
lifetime income in the case of re-entry at T 
Z = age of retirement 
r = discount rate (= long term interest rate) 
The discounted value of the remaining lifetime earnings in the case of re-entry at 
moment T+l is equal to 
5
 By including the loss of skills in ^ we do not have to include correction 
factors in the term lnx in the above earnings equation. Thus these two terms are 
equal for workers with continuous and interrupted working careers when both 
belong to the same homogeneous group with respect to education and age. 
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(7) *T+i,h= S y?,h * *™ dt 
T+l 
wherewT+lh= discounted value at T of potential remaining 
lifetime earnings in the case of re-entry at 
moment T+l. 
Now total individual welfare losses of one additional year of non-employment is 
equal to the difference of these two discounted values for the remaining lifetime 
earnings: 
(8) yT,h = ffT,h * *T+l,h 
whereyTh = total individual welfare losses because of one 
additional year of non-participation at T in case 
of an interruption period of length h 
The total welfare losses defined above can be segregated into primary and second-
ary welfare losses in the following manner 
(9) * = ƒ y?,h * e ™ dt 
T 
where y£
 h = primary welfare losses of one additional year of 
non-participation at age T with interruption of h 
years 
and 
(io) yx!h = yx,h-y?!h 
where y^\ = secondary welfare losses of one additional year 
of non-participation at age T with interruption 
of h years. 
The profile of the income- and depreciation curves depicted in chart 4 has the 
following implications for primary and secondary individual welfare losses: 
- The cumulated investment in human capital increases with age. Hence the 
primary welfare losses concerning non-participants who have left employment at 
a relatively high age are larger than those concerning younger workers with the 
same educational level; 
- Secondary welfare losses decrease with increasing age of the non-participant, 
because the remaining working life becomes shorter with rising age; 
- Primary welfare losses increase with the level of education; 
- The influence of the level of education on secondary welfare losses is 
ambiguous. These losses depend, amongst others, on the shape and charac-
teristics of the age-income profile; 
- When measuring the influence of the length of the interruption period on 
primary welfare losses we should distinguish between two cases: 
a) the non-participant who is situated at the decreasing part of the depreciation 
curve: in that case primary losses will become lower when the interruption 
period has lasted longer; 
b) the non-participant who is situated at the horizontal part of the depreciation 
curve: in this case primary welfare losses are dependent on the shape of the 
income profile; 
- The influence of the length of the interruption period on secondary welfare 
losses is also ambiguous. 
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4. Case-studies of welfare losses. 
In section 2 we assumed that wage costs fully and correctly reflect labour productiv-
ity. Therefore, the theoretical framework of age-income profiles and the calculation 
method as explained in the previous section will be applied on wage costs instead 
of income. 
Using the methodology of section 3 and the estimates of the age-wage costs profiles 
presented in appendix 1 we are able to calculate the individual welfare losses for 
representative non-participants. These representative non-participants are classified 
by three characteristics: level of education, age, and start of intemiption period (or 
alternatively number of years of non-participation). As illustration of the calculation 
method and of the order of magnitude of individual welfare losses, this section 
discusses five hypothetical non-participants. All examples use the following assump-
tions: 
- depreciation rate of human capital is 5% a year; 
- lifetime earnings are discounted at a real long term interest rate of 5%. 
- work experience is measured as age minus years of fulltime education minus 6 
- actual deprecation of human capital lasts 2 years; after 2 years earning capacity 
of the non-participant remains constant; 
- every child is obliged to attend school until the age of 17; 
- it is not possible to earn less than the minimum wage and thus produce less 
than the minimum wage costs. 
Table 1. Individual welfare losses for hypothetical non-participants (guilders, 
1985) 
Cases primary secondary total 
welfare welfare welfare 
losses losses losses 
Case 1. 
30 years old; extended 36,600 
primary education; out of 
employment at 29 
Case 2. 
30 years old; completed 79,500 
academie education; out of 
employment at 29 
Case 3. 
26 years old; completed 45,000 
academie education; did not 
enter employment at 24 
Case 4. 
50 years old; primary 47,900 
education; out of 
employment at 50 
Case 5. 
50 years old; primary 39,900 
education; out of 
employment at 44 
Table 1 gives the results for these cases. The first case considers a 30 year old 
non-participant who has left employment at the age of 29 and has an extended 
10 
54,500 91,100 
118,200 197,700 
64,400 109,400 
30,600 78,500 
4,800 44,700 
primary education. At T=30 human capital of this non-participant has depreciated 
by 5 percent; and in the case where he is still not in paid employment at T=31, hls 
human capital would have depreciated at that moment with 10 percent. However, 
when calculating the potential eamings of this non-participant we should not only 
reckon with the depreciation of human capital, but also with the loss of work 
experience during the period of non-participation by the use of equations (4) and 
(5), which makes the total depreciation percentages equal to 7.7 for T=30 and 15.7 
for T=31. By subtracting potential lifetime eamings at T=31 from potential lifetime 
eamings at T=30 we obtain the individual welfare loss for this non-participant. (See 
case 1 in table 1). 
Our second example is a non-participant who is also 30 years old and has left 
employment at the age of 29, but has a completed academie education instead of 
an extended primary education. According to table 1 the welfare losses of this 
second non-participant appears to be much higher than that of the first one. It is 
especially valid for the secondary welfare losses. The difference can be completely 
ascribed to the difference in level of education since both non-participants are 
equal with respect to all other relevant characteristics. 
Chart 5. Age-wage costs profile of an university graduate who postpones the 
entry to the employment with two years.  
24 2e 27 M H« 
The third example considers a non-participant of 26 years with a completed 
academie education who has delayed the start of his working career: at T=24 he 
finished his education, but did not get a paid job. As we assume for all individuals 
that the depreciation of human capital only lasts for two years, he is on the 
horizontal section of the potential eamings profile at re-entry (line NO in chart 4). 
Chart 5 reproduces the stylized age-wage costs profile for this particular non-
participant. In this case the total depreciation of human capital at T=27 is equal to 
that at T=26. However, the loss of work experience is larger at T=27 than at 
T=26, because the reference worker who did start his working career at T=24 will 
have had an additional year of work experience. Table 1 shows that the welfare loss 
of this university graduate who did not find a job after the completion of his study, 
is less than that of the non-participant of Case 2. Two causes are responsible for 
this effect: compared with the individual in Case 2 the university graduate with the 
delayed start of his career has accumulated less human capital through work 
experience and his interruption spell has been longer. 
In the fourth case we calculate the welfare loss for a non-participant of 50 years 
who has left employment in the same year and who has a primary education only. 
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Table 1 illustrates that this relatively old non-participant incurs much smaller 
secondary welfare losses than a young non-participant. When we combine the old 
age with a long interruption speti (Case 5) we see that the secondary welfare loss 
becomes particularly small. 
5. National welfare losses 
The welfare loss of low employment participation on a national level is estimated 
using individual welfare losses of n groups of persons, which are homogeneous with 
respect to education, age and length of the interruption spell. Besides these data, 
we need multiplication factors for the three subgroups mentioned in section 1: the 
unemployed, the disabled and the voluntarily non-participating people. For this we 
use CBS data from the Labour Force Survey of 1985. 
In order to determine the multiplication factor of unemployment we assume that 
frictional unemployment is a necessary condition for a well-functioning labour 
market and will therefore be excluded from the calculation of the welfare losses. 
The welfare losses of unemployment are calculated for about 400 thousand persons. 
Among disabled people in the Netherlands, a numerous amount have earning 
capacity. Due to labour market factors, like unemployment and technological 
development, persons were declared disabled although they still had the capacity to 
fulfil paid jobs. We assume that this hidden unemployment in disability is 14 
percent (Vrooman and de Kemp, 1990) of the total number of disabled people, and 
amounts to about 100 thousand persons. Most of these people are assumed to be 
between the ages of 50 to 65 years and have a primary or extended primary 
education. This assumption implies that the national welfare losses of disability are 
relatively small compared to unemployment and voluntary non-participation. 
Voluntary non-participants in employment are assumed to be female. We take an 
adjusted labour force participation rate of men as a benchmark for women 6 and 
we calculate the total welfare losses of non-participating women up to this point. In 
doing so our calculations comprise 1.7 million women, who would be in employ-
ment when the benchmark participation rate is reached. 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the total, primary and secondary welfare losses 
for the economy as a whole. All estimates are based on the same assumptions as in 
the case-studies (section 4). 
Table 2. Welfare losses on macro-economie level, the Netherlands, 1985, in 
billions of guilders  
primary secondary total 
welfare welfare welfare 
losses losses losses % of GNP 
Unemployment 18.8 
Disability 4.9 
Voluntary non-participation 71.7 
Total 95.4 
9.0 27.8 6.6 
0 3 5.2 1.2 
12.7 71.7 17.1 
22.0 104.7 25.0 
6
 The labour force participation of men is adjusted in order to account for the 
male disabled individuals who have earning capacity and related to the total male 
population in the age of 15-65. 
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The total welfare loss due to a low employment participation rate is about 25 
percent of GNP in 1985. The share of secondary welfare losses is not as large as 
most case studies in section 4 suggest. The reason for this is the distribution of the 
subgroups over the relevant characteristics. Numerous voluntary non-participants 
and disabled people have interrupted their career for a long period. Moreover, the 
working capadty of the disabled is assumed to be among the older people. As the 
fifth case study shows, secondary welfare costs are relatively low for those sub-
groups . 
For unemployment the total welfare losses in 1985 are about 7 percent of the GNP. 
The latter percentage is in line with the percentage Mittelstadt and Roberti 
estimated for the OECD-area (6.1%) and the 9.4 percent of The European Trade 
Union Institute. The estimates of Junankar for unemployment are somewhat higher 
than the estimates in this paper. 
The national welfare losses in table 2 look like huge golden mountains, which 
should be digged off as soon as possible. However, we must realize that our 
definition of welfare losses results in calculated costs, which are not totally avoid-
able. They can be viewed as the opportunity costs of non-participation in employ-
ment. 
6. Sensitivitv analvsis 
Our estimates of welfare losses of non-participation in employment are based on a 
number of assumptions concerning the different stages in the career of a worker 
(section 3). In this section we investigate the sensitivity of our calculation method 
with respect to the following assumptions: the yearly depreciation rate of human 
capital, the long term interest rate and the wage costs related to the minimum 
wage as the lower benchmark of productivity. In each altemative calculation we 
vary one assumption and compare the results with the central calculation. The 
results are summarized in table 3. 
Table 3. Macro-economie welfare losses in the Netherlands under different 
assumptions, in billions of guilders, 1985 
dis-
abled 
voluntary 
unem- non-
ployed participants : total 
%of 
GNP 
Central a) 
of which primary 
of which secondary 
5.2 
4.9 
0.3 
27.8 
18.8 
9.0 
71.7 
59.0 
12.7 
104.7 
82.7 
22.0 
25.0 
I: depreciation 0.5% 
of which primary 
of which secondary 
5.7 
5.4 
03 
25.7 
20.0 
5.7 
73.7 
60.7 
13.0 
105.1 
86.1 
19.1 
25.1 
II: long term interest 2% 
of which primary 
of which secondary 
5.3 
5.0 
03 
32.7 
19.1 
13.6 
79.1 
59.9 
19.2 
117.1 
84.0 
33.1 
28.0 
III: no minimum wage 
of which primary 
of which secondary 
5.2 
4.9 
03 
29.6 
18.4 
11.2 
56.6 
45.4 
11.2 
91.4 
68.7 
22.7 
21.8 
depreciation of human capita] is 5% a year, long term interest rate is 5% a year, productivity is 
bounded below 
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Lowering the yearly depredation rate of human capital has a relatively small impact 
on the total welfare losses. Although we would expect increasing primary and 
decreasing secondary losses, the primary losses become only slightly more import-
ant. The small magnitude of this impact is caused by a combination of two effects: 
the minimum wage costs and the length of the interruption period. Labour 
productivity is bounded below by the minimum wage costs, which is particulary 
relevant for the estimation of welfare losses of voluntary non-participation. Because 
a large part of the voluntary non-participants experience long interruption periods, 
this minimum level is reached in the case of both depredation rates. 
Lowering the long term interest rate has an increasing effect on the total welfare 
losses and espedally on the secondary losses. The long term interest rate deter-
mines the weight of the future losses of production in the total losses. A low 
discount rate implies a relatively high share of secondary losses, while a high 
discount rate implies a low impact of secondary losses. These expectations are 
verified by our calculations. 
Table 3 shows that although the minimum wage costs, which bound productivity 
below, have an increasing effect on the total welfare losses, we see different effects 
for the subgroups distinguished. The third senitivity analysis shows us the effect of a 
release of the the minimum wage level (p* = 0 in equation 2). The direction in 
which secondary losses are altered are dependent of the length of the period out of 
employment. There is no effect on the welfare losses of disability, because most 
earning capadty is among the age category 50-65 and they earn, even if we account 
for depredation of human capital and forgone experience, more than the minimum 
wage level because of their age. After two years of non-partidpation the earning 
capadty of this group, does not fall below the minimum level so releasing this 
productivity restriction does not alter the welfare losses. For the unemployed we 
see an increase in the secondary welfare losses. Instead of reaching the minimum 
level after one year of non-partidpation, human capital depredates for an addi-
tional year. The decrease of secondary losses for voluntary non-partidpation result 
from the long period of interruption. These non-partidpants are positioned on the 
horizontal part of the depredation curve (line NO in chart 4). The release of the 
minimum wage level means a decrease of production at re-entry at T or at T+l. 
This results in a lower nominal growth of production caused by the assumption of 
equal investment ratio's of individuals with the same age and educational level. 
7. Conclusion 
Employment partidpation rate in the Netherlands is low. This paper defines a 
framework and a methodology for computation of individual welfare losses through 
non-partidpation in employment. The method is based on the human capital theory. 
In order to construct flow data we deGne the individual welfare losses of non-
partidpation as the loss of potential productivity of a non-participant in the case of 
one additional year of non-partidpation. Thus we distinguish between primary losses 
due to the loss of potential production during one year and secondary losses which 
relate to the additional loss of potential earnings of the non-participant because of 
the depredation of his human capital and the loss of additional work experience 
(no further investment in human capital). 
In order to illustrate this method we calculated the welfare losses for hypothetical 
individual cases. These calculations are based on estimates of age-wage costs 
profiles for five levels of education in the Netherlands using data for 1985. Of 
course the value of these losses depends on a number of assumptions which we 
have made explidt. Therefore the main aim of this paper is to clarify how welfare 
losses can be calculated, and what assumptions are relevant in that respect. It is 
shown that the calculation of welfare losses requires empirical evidence on the 
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speed and time shape of the depredation of human capital, and on the investments 
in human capital after the interruption period. Finally we have aggregated the 
individual welfare losses up to national welfare losses by multiplication of the 
individual losses for homogeneous groups of non-partidpants by the number of 
people belonging to these groups. We estimate the national welfare loss of non-
partidpation in employment as 26 percent of the Gross National Product in 1985. 
About 70 percent of this loss originates from voluntary non-partidpating women, 25 
percent is caused by unemployment and 5 percent by disablement. 
We tested the sensitivity of our calculations by varying assumptions. It appears that 
the calculated welfare loss is sensitive to the assumptions concerning the minimum 
level of productivity and the discount rate. Variation in the yearly depredation rate 
of human capital has only a small effect on the total welfare losses. 
The welfare loss calculated should be considered as a gross welfare loss, since we 
do not account for the costs, productivity decline and the demand constraints 
assodated with the new jobs for the non-partidpants. In future research we intend 
to analyze the effect of these macro-economie feedback mechanisms. 
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Appendix 1. Estimation of age-wage costs profiles for the Netherlands. 
In order to calculate welfare losses for individual non-participants using the 
methodology of section 3, we need, amongst others things, values for the constant 
term a and the parameters b and c of the age-wage costs profUe of formula (3) for 
each level of education. In order to measure these parameters we estimate equation 
(3) using CBS-data on gross wages in 1985 in the Netherlands which are available 
for 5 levels of education and for 9 age-groups. These gross wages are transformed 
to wage costs by multiplication factors for specified gross income categories 
provided by the Central Planning Bureau. Table A l gives the data on gross wages 
and shows how they rise with age and with the level of education. 
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As only 45 observations are available, estimation of equation (3) for each level of 
education separately would incur too big a loss of degrees of freedom.7 Therefore 
we have perfonned a joint regression with a dummy variable for each level of 
education. We assume that only the constant term in equation (3) is different for 
each level of education, whereas the infiuence of the number of years of work 
experience on wage costs is assumed to be the same for all levels of education. The 
outcome for this regression equation with t-values in parentheses is as follows: 
(11) In y = 9.19 + 0.44 In (x + 5.16) + 0.13 DUL + 032 DM + 0.52 DHBO 
(37.6) (7.0) (3.0) (2.7) (6J5) (8.4) 
0.90 DWO 
(17.7) 
R2 = 0,96 
Explanation of symbols: 
y = wage costs in 1985 
x = years of work experience (T-s-6) 
s = years of education 
T 
DUL 
DM 
DHBO 
DWO 
• age 
- dummy for extended primary education 
= dummy for secondary education 
= dummy for extended secondary and technical education 
= dummy for academie education 
The outcome of this regression is most satisfactory: all coëfficiënt values differ 
significantly from zero and both coeffïcients with respect to work experience obtain 
the correct sign. Moreover the coëfficiënt of the dummy variables get plausible 
values, as they indicate how much higher the earnings of the respective levels of 
education are as compared to the first level of education (primary school only) 
given the same number of years of work experience. Hence this estimation result 
shows that the people with an academie education earn almost twice as much as 
people with primary schooling only. 
Chart Al gives the age-wage costs profiles calculated by means of this equation. 
7
 In fact even less than 45 observations are available as some cells of the data 
matrix are empty. 
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Chart Al. Estimated age-wage costs profiles for different levels of education in 
the Netherlands, 1985. 
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Table Al. Average gross monthly wages on a full time basis of workers in the 
manufacturing and service sectors in the Netherlands in 1985 ^ 
level of education: extended higher 
pnmary pnmary secondaiy vocational academie 
age in years: 
16-19 (1298) 
20-24 2124 2220 2444 (3208) 
25-29 2699 2906 (3054) 3739 
30-34 3045 3436 (3693) 4817 
35-39 (2870) 3255 3695 (4394) 5925 
40-44 (2916) 3416 4099 6609 
4549 (3001) 3464 (4234) 7212 
50-54 (3057) 3526 (4214) 7329 
55-64 (3630) (4562) 7924 
1) wages in parentheses are based on 100-150 observations, those without parentheses 
on more than ISO observations 
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